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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EDWIN GOSSNER, et al,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 16593

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, a Utah
corporation; THE STATE OF UTAH,
by and through its Division of
State Lands,
Defendants-Respondents
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by 33 farmers against Utah Power &
Light Company for damages to their crops, and for loss of
farming profits during the years 1974 through 1979, the
plaintiffs having incurred their damages by virtue of Utah
Power & Light Company having managed the Bear River in such
a way as to cause the river\to overflow onto plaintiffs'
lands.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This is an interlocutory appeal taken prior to trial on
the merits, the Court having conducted a pretrial conference
and having ruled at that conference that he would exclude
certain evidence and apply a certain commencement date of the
statute of limitations, the propriety of which rulings the
parties desire to have determined prior to trial on the merits.

1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This is an appeal from an Order entered by the Trial
Court under date of July 3, 1979, the appeal being limited
three issues.

~

The Order appealed from is attached to this

Brief as Appendix "A".
The three issues raised are as follows:
(1)

The Trial Court's declared intent to utilize an
improper date of commencement of statute of
limitations.

(2)

Error in the Court's declared intent to limit
evidence of fault and causation in the following
respects:
(a)

to deny introduction of testimony as to the
effect of negligent operation of Oneida Dam,
and

(b)

ruling that the Kimball and Dietrich Decrees
permit a discharge of 5,500 cfs when, in fact,
the Decrees limit the discharge of waters to
those which can be contained in the "natural
channel."

( 3)

The erroneous dismissal of plaintiffs Edwin Gassner
and Josephine

Go7~ner

by virtue of flood easements.

Appellants seek an Order of the Supreme Court on remand
to the Trial Court providing the following directions to the
Trial Court:
(1)

That the statute of limitations as to damage to
crops commences at the time of each successive
injury to the crops;

(2)

That plaintiffs be permitted to present testimony
as to the causative effect of the operation of the
Oneida Darn (and the discharges therefrom) on the
flooding which they have experienced.

(3)

That the Court be directed that the Kimball and
Dietrich Decrees permit discharges in the Cache
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Valley section of the Bear River by Utah Power up
to and not exceeding the capacity of the natural
channel, and not up to the limit of 5,500 cfs, as
erroneously determined by the ?rial court.
(4)

That the dismissal of the claims of Edwin and
Josephine Gossner on summary judgment be reversed,
with directions to the Court to present the
factual questions of:
(a)

increase of the burden of the flood easement; and

(b)

negligent abuse of the flood easement

to the jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs consist of 33 farmers having a claim
against Utah Power & Light Company for the flooding of their
farms along the Bear River in the years 1974 through 1979.
The claims are limited to damage to crops and damages
for inability to plant crops, and do not contain any claims
for damage to the land itself, the plaintiffs' claims
totalling over $540,000.
All of the farms are located downstream of the Oneida
Dam in Idaho and upstream

?,f" 'the

Cutler Dam and Reservoir

near Logan, Utah.
The record establishes that the flooding of the plaintiffs' lands is caused primarily by two factors (see Affidavit
of Dr. James Milligan attached to this Brief as Appendix "B",
R. 1187):

(1)

The building up of sediment in the riverbed,
decreasing the flow-carrying capacity of the
channel caused by the following:
(a)
the backwater effect of the Cutler Reservoir, and
(b)

the fact that the presence of both the Oneida
and cutler Dams substantially decreases the

3
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normal "scouring out" of sedir.1ent buildup whic!
would occur each spring during the flood
season if the dams were not present.
(2)

The discharge of waters from Oneida Dam at volumes
and time-durations which result in discharge of
more water than the natural channel of the river
can carry, thus causing the excess waters to flood
out onto the farmlands.

Plaintiffs filed the action in the fall of 1976 for
damages to their crops, going back three years under the
three-year statute for the years 1974, 1975 and 1976.

Add~

tionally, they claim damages for the succeeding years of
1977, 1978 and 1979.
Since the filing of the Complaint, Utah Power & Light
has modified its operation of the system to prevent most of
the flooding, but for each of the latter three years the
plaintiffs, in an effort to determine whether or not they
could justify planting their lands, served interrogatories on
Utah Power inquiring as to whether or not they could anticipate flooding, which interrogatories the Power Company has
consistently failed to answer in a manner which would justify
the farmers planting their,,+ands.
Accordingly, for the latter three years, some farmers
have damages for loss of profits on crops which were actually
planted and flooded, or grasses which were flooded, whereas
various others did not plant for fear of losing their entire
crops as they had in the years immediately preceding.
ARGUMENT
PART I:

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE

Paragraph (3) of the Order incorrectly provides that
the Court will rule that the statute of limitations commenced
at the first date the plaintiffs were flooded, rather than

4
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adopting the proper rule which is that each time a new trespass is conunitted damaging crops, the statute as to that
damage conunences at the time of the flooding, the Order
stating:
"The Court holds as a matter of law that the three
year statute of limitations (which is applicable to
plaintiffs' claims) began to run from the date when the
channel of the Bear River was filled with silt (caused
by the erection of the Cutler Dam) so as to cause
flooding of the adjacent farm land of plaintiffs."
Utah law requires that in order to gain a prescriptive
easement on another party's land, one must make open,
notorious, hostile use of that land for a period of 20 consecutive years.
The effect of the Trial Court's ruling is to reduce the
period for gaining a prescriptive right to three years.
The fact is that there has never been a period of 20
consecutive years when the farmers were flooded.

In fact,

there has been virtually no flooding for the last three
years (1977 through 1979).
The Affidavit of Dr. Milligan (Appendix "B" hereto)
states:
. . Utah Power & Lfght could have managed the discharges
at Oneida Dam in a manner to prevent flooding of the
plaintiffs' farms during the crop season had it chosen
to do so."
The jugular vein of the issue of when the statute of
limitations commences to run is the determination of whether
or not the cause of the flooding is permanent and must occur
every year that the dams stand in place, or, rather, whether
it is what is termed in the case law as "abatable" or
"continuous", the word "continuous" meaning in the context
of these cases something which recurs but does not, of
necessity, have to recur.

5
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No tortuous twisting of the facts can disguise the abatability of the flooding in the face of the documented hist~k
abatement.

FLOODING I

RESULTING FROM THE NEGLIGENT OPERATION

OF A DAM SYSTEM, IS AN ABATABLE, AND NOT A PERMANENT, CAUSE
OF INJURY.
The question of when a cause of action based on injuries
to property by flowage, diversion or obstruction of waters
accrues where the flooding is the direct and proximate result
of the negligent operation of the dam system and not the
result of the naked existence of the dam has never been
expressly decided by a court of appellate jurisdiction in
the state of Utah.
Numerous cases, arising in the various jurisdictions,
make it clear that if, and when, Utah does decide this questic
Utah will follow the clear majority in holding that flooding
resulting from the negligent operation of the dam, as opposed
to flooding resulting from design characteristics inherent
in the construction of the dam, is abatable, and as such, a
new cause of action arises with each fresh injury.
A line of cases, decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas,
illustrate dramatically tha.t force of logic compels the
conclusion that injuries

tc;>." property

resulting from flooding

;''

which could have been prevented by the defendant short of the
destruction of his dam system are abatable, and will support
a new cause of action for each injury.
In HENDERSON v. TALBOTT, 266 P.2d 273 (Kans. 1954), the
Court held that where water was impounded on the plaintiff's
land which ebbed and flowed, depending upon the season of the
year and the amount of rainfall, the plaintiff's injuries wer;
temporary, not permanent, and each injury caused a new cause
of action to accrue and the statute of limitations began to
run anew from the date of each injury.

The Court stated:
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"W~ are convince~ the rules, established by the great
weight of authority.a~d recognized and applied by our
bette~ reasoned decision, governing and decisive of such
question ~s wel~ as the q~estion whether the flooding
of land gives rise to a single right or successive rights
of action are those succinctly set forth and stated in
56 Am. Jur., Waters 529 § 45:

"' ***In actions by riparian owners for damages
for interference with the flow of a stream the
scope of recovery is usually held to depend on
whether the injury is permanent or continuing. The
weight of authority is to the effect that whenever
the structure of obstruction impeding the flow
of water is of a permanent character, and its construction and continuance are necessarily an injury,
the damage is considered original, to be recovered
in one action, and not continuous in character, and
the statute of limitations begins to run from the
completion of the obstruction, or at least from the
time of the first injury. But when the construction
of the structure are not necessarily injuries, but
may or may not be so, the injury to be compensated
in the suit is only the damage which has happened;
and there may be as many successive recoveries as
there are successive injuries. In such cases the
statute of limitations begins to run from the
happening of the injury complained of.'"
(Emphasis
supplied)
The HENDERSON case go~s on to quote 56 Am. Jur. Waters

858, 859, § 443 as follow~V
"'* * *But if the overflow is merely temporary, occasional,
or temporary, causing no permanent injury to the la~d, or
if the situation involves other elements of uncertainty,
such as the possibility or unlikelihood of the alteration
or abatement of the causative conditions, or uncertainty
in regard to the future use or improvement of the land,
so as to prevent a reasonably accurate estima~e.of future
damages, it is generally held that each r:petition ~f the
overflow gives rise to a new cause of action for which
successive actions may be brought.'"
This is precisely the situation with which the Court
is confronted herein.

To digress from the line of Kansas

cases briefly, if the cause of action of the plaintiffs

7
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accrued but one time at the construction of the dam, or in
the alternative, at the time of the first injury, and the
plaintiffs had gone into court and asked for damages, includi:
damages for the injuries that are the basis of the instant
lawsuit, how should the Court have responded to the argument
of Utah Power that its operation of its dam system was
abatable, and would be abated, and that, therefore, no future
injuries were provable?
This hypothetical situation, while purely speculative,
shows the absurdity of Utah Power's suggestion to the Court
that the statute of limitations commenced upon the first
injury applied to all subsequent injuries.
In SIMON v. NEISES, 395 P.2d 308 (Kansas 1964), the
Kansas Court again had occasion to consider the applicabiliti
of the statute of limitations through an action involving
damage to land.

After reiterating its subscription to the

authorities cited in support of its opinion in HENDERSON v.
TALBOTT, the Court went on to say:

"* * * that where the injury or wrong is classified~
the courts not as original or permanent, but as
temporary, transient, recurring, continuing or consequential in nature, i t has been held that the limibtim
period starts to run .only when the plaintiffs' land or
crops are actually harmed by overflow, and that, for th:
purpose of the statute of limitations, each injury
causes a new cause of action to accrue, at least until
the injury becomes permanent."
In GOWING v. McCANDLESS, 547 P.2d 338

(Kans. 1976) the

Court, after reiterating the rule laid down in the two previr
cited cases, held that the plaintiffs were seeking to recove:
temporary damages arising from the maintenance of obstructio:
in the watercourse on defendant's land, and limited the
. d it
recovery they sought to damages to their crop, sustaine
w

the statutory period prior to the filing of their petition,
the plaintiffs' cause of action was not barred by the statut
of limitations.

The Court, in GOWING, after noting that the
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obstructions which caused the flooding were not "permanent"
because they could be removed from the drainage ditch (as
well as the fact that they were not "permanent" in the legal
sense because they were not approved by the state) , found
that the plaintiffs' cause of action was not barred by the
statute of limitations.
Here, again, the Kansas Court seized upon the crucial
distinction between a permanent cause of flooding produced
by the inherent and unmodifiable design characteristics, such
as lawfully placed darns and bridges, as opposed to temporary
causes such as the buildup of silt or the negligent operation
of what would otherwise be a permanent improvement.
The line of Kansas cases referred to herein is concluded
by CLAWSON v. GARRISON, 592 P.2d 117 (Kans. 1979).

The

holding in CLAWSON makes clear the underlying basis of the
adoption of the rule set out in the previously cited cases.
The CLAWSON Court states:
"Flooding is an infrequent and virtually unpredictable
occurrence. The amount of both present and future
damages to defendant could not reasonably be determined
in a single action."
(The flooding being refer.r~d. to was produced by an upper
landowner's leveling of lar\d reducing its capability to
retain surface water.)
Other states have announced rules for determining the
accrual of a cause of action which are substantially the same
as that followed by the Kansas Court.

The Supreme Court of

Idaho in WOODLAND v. LYON, 298 P.2d 380 (1956), was called upon
to determine whether a continuing diversion of water from
a watercourse to the injury of the downstream landowner was
a single wrong or a continuing one.

The Idaho Court stated:

"The tort herein alleged is not a single wrong, but
a continuing one, and appellant may, if the evidence
supports his claim, recover for all injuries occurring

9
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within the statutory period, even though the obstruction
occurred more than four years before the complaint
was filed."
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in CITY OF COLLINSVILLE
v. SWISHER, 162 P.2d 324

(1945), decided a case which is

particularly analogous to the case before the Court.

In that

case, the city had constructed a pipeline at such levels that
when the water rose to a certain point in the river it was
forced through the pipeline into the reservoir.

Somewhere

along the line a manhole was constructed to acconunodate a
cutoff valve, which the city neglected to keep closed, and
through this valve and manhole water ran out upon plaintiff's
land overflowing, and some of the water remained on the land
until the water in the river lowered to where the water stanc.
on the plaintiff's land could recede back through the pipe
into the river.
The evidence showed that the land would not have overflowed but for the pipeline and the negligent maintenance ani
operation of the cutoff valve through which the water flowed
upon plaintiff's land.

The Court stated:

"Under the foregoing authorities the limitation is set
in motion to the action for damages for such injuries a'
were the natural and; qbvious result of the erection of
the permanent improve~ents at the time of the cornpletic:
thereof, but this rule does not apply to such other
injuries as subsequently resulted from the negligent
maintenance or operation of the improvements, and the
limitation as to the latter is set in motion at the
time such injuries occur."
That is precisely the situation with which the Court is
herein confronted.

The plaintiffs do not claim that the

erection of the dam in and of itself caused them harm.
The existence of the dam, the only "permanent" aspect of thi
setting of this case, is not alleged by the plaintiffs to
necessarily cause injury.

It is, rather, the operation of
the system by Utah Power that is causing the injury. Al tho
the erection of Cutler Dam is permanent and does cause t~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sediment buildup in the river channel due to the backwater
effect, Utah Power has the option of either dredging the channel
or decreasing its flow of water from Oneida.

All irrigation

districts have to clean their canals from time to
time, and we know of no special law which gives Utah Power
license to clog up its channel and then proceed to use the
farmers' lands as a substitute for that channel.
tinction is obvious.

This dis-

It is the same distinction pointed up

by the popular bumper sticker that reads "Guns don't kill
people, people kill people."
Finally, the Court, in NELSON, et al, v. ROBINSON, et al,
118 P.2d 350 (Cal. 1941), states the general rule governing
actions of this character:
"The courts of this state have repeatedly held that one
who permits water to percolate from his artificial canal
to the property of his adjoining neighbor commits an
invasion of the latter's rights for which redress is
obtainable in damages, by injunction or through the
abatement of a nuisance."
(Emphasis supplied)
While the Court is confronted with flooding produced by
the negligent operation of a darn system, as opposed to percolating waters resulting

f~om

an artificial canal, the

principle is the same.
;\I
The court, in NELSON, makes a statement which is not only
incisive but illustrates the folly of Utah Power's assertion
that only one cause of action has accrued in this case, which
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

The

Court states:
"No one should be permitted to acquire a prescriptive
right to continue a negligent act. We therefore hold
that appellants are entitled to reco~er.for any injury
to their lands which was inflicted within three years
prior to the commencement of the action."
Clearly, the court would reach an anomalous result if it
were to hold, as Utah Power has requested, that a single
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cause of action accrued many years ago which is not blocked
by the statute of limitations.

If it were to so hold, the

Court would have decided that in three years Utah Power coulc
gain a prescriptive right to continue its negligent acts,
whereas Utah law requires twenty years to gain a prescriptive
easement.
In its briefing in the Trial Court, Utah Power misled
the Court citing HAYES v. ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO
RAILROAD

co.,

162 SW 266 (Mo. 1914), for the proposition

that where a dam is completely built and therefore permanent,
the statute of limitations commences when the dam first
causes flooding.

Anticipating that that case may be relied

upon again by Utah Power, we invite the Court's attention to
the fact that the Court, in HAYES, defined the determining
factor to be whether or not the injury is necessarily a
permanent injury as opposed to the other type of injury
which is variously termed by the Courts to be continuous or
abatable.

The rule of law applicable to the instant case is

stated twice at page 268 of the Southwestern Reporter:
"
. . but where the nuisance is of a continuing (abatable) nature, each continuance gives rise to a new caus:
of action, and successive actions may be maintained
for the damages accruing from time to time.
''\!
.Nuisances consisting of acts done, or particular
uses of property, may be properly termed 'continuing'
when they are such a character that they may continue
indefinitely, or, on the other hand, may be discontinued at any time."
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact that Utah Power was able to stop the flooding
during the last three years is, at least, prima facie evider.:
that the injury is abatable and subject to discontinuation
rather than permanent.
The Court, in HAYES, quotes with approval from CARSON v.
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, 53 Mo. App. 289, the following language
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. . When the n~isance or cause of the injury may be
~emoved or remedied at any time, the measure of damages
~s t~e a~tual damage sustained up to the date of the
institution of the suit. Damages accruing subsequently
must be recovered in successive actions."
That, of course, is the situation here.
ment illustrates this.
PART II.

The historical abate-

UTAH POWER IS ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

Should the Supreme Court disagree with the position of the
farmers on the date of commencement of the statute of limitations, then, in that event, the remand should direct the Trial
Court to permit the presentation of testimony to the jury on
the issue that the Utah Power & Light Company is estopped to
assert the statute of limitations defense.
The reply of the plaintiffs to the Answer and Counterclaim
of Utah Power contains a Motion to Strike the Fourth Affirmative
Defense of Utah Power, as set forth in an Amendment to the
Reply reading as follows

(R. 1183):

"COME NOW the plaintiffs and move the court for an order
amending their Reply to the Answer of Utah Power and
Light by adding a Motion to Strike as follows:
"'To strike the P~mrth Affirmative Defense to the
effect that the claim of plaintiffs is barred by
the statute of i'imitations upon the ground that
Utah Power is estopped to assert said defense by
virtue of having in numerous meetings with
plaintiffs:
"'(a)

U I

(b)

denied that its facilities caused the
flooding; and
provided plaintiffs with engineering
studies over the years allegedly
demonstrating Utah Power's nonresponsibili ty. '"

The depositions of the various plaintiffs establish that
they had numerous meetings with Utah Power officials since
1948, in which Utah Power denied that its facilities or its
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mode of operation of the facilities was causing the flooding
Certainly, in face of those affirmative representations to
the plaintiffs by Utah Power which were given for the

pur~~

of forestalling lawsuits (and did have that effect), Utah
Power is estopped from now raising the statute of limitations.
This, of course, is a factual matter which must be determinea
upon the evidence at trial, and we simply ask that the remand
require that the Trial Court allow evidence to be presented c
this issue.
There is a further aspect to the statute of limitations
question, and that is the fact that most jurisdictions provic
that a statute of limitations does not commence to run until
a person knew, or should have known, of the cause of his
injury.

In the instant case Utah Power is denying that its

facilities and its operation of its facilities are the C9H
of any flooding on plaintiffs' lands, and since Utah Power
makes such denial, certainly it is estopped from asserting
that plaintiffs "knew, or should have known," of Utah
Power's culpability at some earlier date.
The fact is that the plaintiffs procured a preliminary
engineering study in

197~

it was not until final

<\nd filed suit that same year, and

en~1~neering

work was completed

by Dr. Milligan in preparation for trial in 1979, that

t~

plaintiffs actually had solid proof that Utah Power is
responsible for the flooding.
PART III.

THE TRIAL COURT ORDER ERRS IN RULING THAT THE
KIMBALL AND DIETRICH DECREES ESTABLISH NO LIABILITY OF UTAH POWER AND LIGHT WHERE THE DISCHARG:
FROM ONEIDA DAM DOES NOT EXCEED 5,500 CFS.

The Order reads, in part, as follows under Section (21
thereof (Appendix "A" hereto):
"The Court further rules as a matter of law that with
regard to the release of waters the standard of ca:e
imposed upon the defendant is established by the K1mba 1
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and Dietrich decrees, and inasmuch as it is stipulated
that such releases have never exceeded 5 500 cf
th
·
1· b· ·
,
s,
ere
l~ n~ .ia l 1 i~y of the defendant either in absolute
11ab1l1t~ or in negligence because of release of water
from Oneida Dam."
We have appended the pertinent parts of the Idaho Deitrich
Decree to this Brief as Appendix "C", and the pertinent parts
of the Kimball Decree as Appendix "D".
The Dietrich Decree is from a federal district court
case in Idaho, wherein Utah Power & Light was granted the
authority to collect and impound the waters during flood
season at Stewart Dam near Bear Lake up to a maximum water
right of 5,500 cfs.
At no point in the Dietrich Decree did the Court give
the right to discharge waters at that level in the Cache
Valley, the Dietrich Decree stating at page 8:
• • . and the waters released by it from storage may
be conveyed through the NATURAL CHANNEL of the
river . . .
(Note the Decree states "natural channel" not entire flood
plain.)
The Kimball Decree incorporated the Idaho Dietrich Decree
\

by reference, and then, with
.. respect to the right of Utah
Power to discharge waters, the Decree stated at page 6:
"After passing said state line such released stored
waters may be conveyed through that part of the
natural channel of said river covered by this Decree.
There is in this record an Affidavit of plaintiffs'
engineer, Dr. James Milligan,

(App. "B" hereto) stating

specifically:
. . • (1)
The natural channel of the Bear River at
various points between Oneida Dam and Cutler Reservoir,
and in particular the areas at or near the farms o~
the plaintiffs, will over~low its banks whe~ the river
contains a flow of approximately 3,400 cfs.
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"

Thus, the Trial Court is clearly in error in its use of the
5,500 cfs figure, and unless the Supreme Court corrects that
error on this interlocutory appeal the plaintiffs will not
even have an opportunity to present this liability issue __
at best, the question is a factual question and not a matter
of law.
The evidence through the depositions establishes that
the right to collect 5,500 cfs up in Idaho at the Stewart
Dam is a collection of waters at flood stage.

Historically

there have never been discharges during the crop season,
and certainly not in July, August and September, of flows
of 5,500 cfs in the Cache Valley.
It should further be noted that both the Kimball and
Dietrich actions were actions for determinations of water
rights and were not actions to condemn land for flood easements.

Both Decrees granted Utah Power and Light the right

to collect 5,500 cfs above Bea= Lake and store that water in
Bear Lake, and both Decrees provided that the discharge of
that water would be through the natural channel and not over
the whole flood plain, including the farms of all of the
farmers from Bear Lake to Salt Lake.

It is important that

this error be corrected ori' 1the remand so that proper evidenc~
can be presented to the jury, particularly on the issue that
the discharges at Oneida under the control of Utah Power
during the years of the flooding have been due to their
negligent operation of the Oneida discharge levels in
derogation of the rights of the plaintiff farmers.
PART IV.

THE IMPROPER DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINTS OF PLAIN!;
EDWIN AND JOSEPHINE GOSSNER BY VIRTUE OF AN EARLY
FLOOD EASEMENT.
The Trial Court Order of July 3, 1979 rules as follows·,

respect to the Summary Judgment against Edwin and Josephine
Gassner:
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· It ~s ~ur~her ordered that the Motion for
Jud~me~t d1sm1~s1ng with prejudice the complaint

Summary
of the
th

plaintiffs Edwin Gossner and Josephine Gossner
0
ground that they and their predecessors have h~re~ofo~e
conveyed fl~od easements to Utah Power and Light be
and hereby is granted."

The issue whether or not an easement has been negligently
abused or whether the burden on the easement has been wrongfully
increased is a jury question.
Utah Power has filed as a "Third Claim for Relief"
commencing at page 4 of its Amended Answer and Counterclaim, a
defense as to the plaintiff, Ed Gassner, that the power company
holds a flood easement on his land and that, therefore, his
claim is not proper and that, additionally, he is liable for
attorney's fees and court costs for participating in this
action.
The fact is that the Gassner Flood Easement was executed
on the then existing type of operation of the river in 1953,
and that operation has changed materially in recent years so
that i t is flooding more of Mr. Gossner's land at different
and more inconvenient times than existed at the time the
easement was taken.

The law is, as established by a Ninth

Circuit Court case involv~n'g Utah Power
a flood easement is not a 'defense.

&

In GRIFFITH v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.

Light, that such
(1955), 226 F.2d

661, the Ninth Circuit Court held that even where the power
company has a perpetual easement, still it may be held
liable for damages caused by its wrongful or negligent
flooding of the plaintiff.
In GRIFFITH, the Ninth Circuit Court overruled a dismissal granted by the District Judge on summary judgment,
premised on the existence of the easements, the Court
stating at page 668:
"Even if defendant had an absolute right, under the
principle that one must not use even vested pr~p~rty
in such a manner wrongfully or negligently to lnJure
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another, there was a cause of action stated. This
unquestionably made a genuine issue of material fact
upon which plaintiffs were entitled to a jury. No
matter how convenient it may have been for defendant a
the trial court to have disposed of the whole case by r
finding the fact established by the uncontroverted
affidavits of defendant, the ruling would have been
error.
"The trial court was vested with no discretion. The
Federal Constitution gives a right of jury trial in a
contested issue in a law action.
This right is positive
and should not be whittled away by decision of contestec
issues by the judge at hearings in camera before tri~.
The summary judgment rule does not confer this power
even in a nonjury case.
The remedy can be invoked
only when complete absence of genuine fact issue appears
on the face of the record.
Resort to summary j udgrnent
procedure is futile where there is any doubt as to
whether there is a fact issue.
All doubts upon the
point must be resolved against the moving party. This
Rule, on account of these limitations, was not intended
to be used as a substitute for a regular trial of cases
where rthere are disputed issues of fact upon which the
outcome of the litigation depends.'
This procedure
is not, and of right ought not to be, a substitute for
a trial by jury or judge. Plaintiffs had set up a
claim of the negligence of defendant in respect to the
release of water through their land. The defendant
controverted the negligence.
Even if the trial court
believed there was no ,chance of recovery, he was bound
to try out the issue. thus contested. This is true even
though the court may';'have believed some one issue was
decisive."
In other words, the GRIFFITH case stands for the propo·
sition that even if the power company has a right to flood
lands under certain conditions, it can be held accountable i
negligence if i t unnecessarily and negligently does so.
The Court further held in GRIFFITH that a perpetual
easement granted to a power and light company for flooding c
lands in the operation of dams must be construed in the ligt
of conditions prevailing at the time of its making, the
Court stating at page 667:
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" . . . • The part~es, furthermore, must have construed
th~ ~nstrument i~ th~ light of the conditions prevailing at the time it was made."
(Citing Hogan v.
Blakney, 73 Idaho 274, 251 P.2d 209)
JOHNSON v. TWIN FALLS CANAL

co.

(1946), 66 Idaho 660,

167 P.2d 834, holds that a grant of right to flood land does
not carry with it the right to erode and destroy the land.
In the JOHNSON case the water level contemplated at the time
that the easements were acquired was a level of about eight
feet, and the Court held the easements did not give the canal
company the right to increase the water level to eleven feet
and thus cause erosion to plaintiff's land.
Thus, under the rule of the GRIFFITH case and the JOHNSON
case, it is a jury question as to whether the power company
has improperly and negligently abused what easements it
might have and as to whether, in light of the conditions
prevailing at the time the easements were given, the company
is liable for its actions.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the
1975 case brought by the Idaho farmers against Utah Power
for flooding near Montpelier along the Bear River also
contained two plaintiffs"wti'o had given flood easements to
Utah Power.

WAYNE KUNZ,

~if al, v. UTAH POWER

&

LIGHT, S26

F.2d 500.
Again, the KUNZ case is attached in full as Appendix "E"
to this Brief, but we quote for the Court's convenience here
the portion of the opinion at pages 504 and SOS, 526 Fed.
Rep., under headnote [10), the Federal Reporter reading as
follows:
"[10)
Utah Power held flood easements on the property
of two of the landowners. The trial court as~ed the
jury for separate verdicts for these two but instructed
it that despite the easements Utah Power 'was not
.
entitled to negligently flood those lands unnecessarily
or to cause damage to those lands which reasonably could
have been prevented.'
Instruction 20. Utah Power
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contends that this charge was erroneous and that it
should be exempt from liability for flood damage to
land on which i t held flood easements.
we find this
instru~tion.to be consistent with the holding of this
Court in Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d
661, 668-69 (9th Cir. 1955), which held the same defend·
ant potentially liable for negligence in causing flood
damage despite the existence of a flood easement. 11
The deposition of Ed Gossner in this case establishes
that at the time he gave the flood easement, the Utah Power
&

Light representatives advised him that there would be no

more flooding to be expected on his lands than he had been
experiencing in previous years.

The representative further told him that he could contir
to use his lands for farming purposes as he had in the past.

Mr. Gossner' s deposition further establishes that up unt

about 1960 he was making excellent use of his bottomlands, in
fact, getting two crops a year off of them by planting rye
in the fall which would be harvested in the spring for silag1
and then planting on the same ground a corn crop which would
be harvested later in the fall for silage -- in fact, it was
his most valuable ground.
His deposition further establishes that commencing about

" to flood his lands to a greater
1960 the power company bei<tn
and greater extent where, until finally in the 1970' s, he wa'
unable to rely on planting any of it.
It is a jury question (and certainly not a matter of la·
to be determined before the evidence is in) as to whether u,
increased flooding on Gossner' s land is due to negligence of
Utah Power.
It is further a jury question as to whether Utah Power
has increased the burden of the flooding beyond that which
was contemplated by the parties when the easement was granti
The deposition of Mr. Gossner sets up those disputed facts,
and Mr. Gossner is entitled to have that question determine;
by the jury, with the granting of summary judgment being
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improper where the record contains a dispute of substantial ,
material facts.
We therefore request that the remand provide that the
action of the Court in granting the summary judgment dismissing Mr. Gossner's complaint be overruled, and that the
Court be directed to present the issues to the jury.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Order of the Trial
Court as to the issues presented on this appeal be reversed,
and that the remand provide:
(1)

That the statute of limitations as to damage to
crops commences at the time of each successive
injury to the crops;

(2)

That plaintiffs be permitted to present testimony
as to the causative effect of the operation of the

Oneida Dam (and the discharges therefrom) on the
flooding which they have experienced.
(3)

That the Court be directed that the Kimball and
Dietrich Decrees permit discharges in the Cache
Valley section o~. the Bear River by Utah Power up
to and not exc~eding the capacity of the natural

•"

channel, and not up to the limit of 5,500 cfs, as
erroneously determined by the Trial Court.
(4)

That the dismissal of the .claims of Edwin and
Josephine Gassner on summary judgment be reversed,
with directions to the Court to present the
factual questions of:
(a)
increase of the burden of the flood easement; and
(bl

negligent abuse of the flood easement

to the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
RACINE, HUNTLEY & OLSON
By·~~-,---:--:::--;-;~;:-,-::-;:---:r::-::--~

Robert C. Huntley, Jr.
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HILLYARD, GUNNELL & LOW

I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing Brief
were mailed to Albert J. Colton, 800 Continental Bank Buildi
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and to Richard L. Dewsnup, 301
Empire /tlding, 231 E. 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 841
this
day of September, 1979, in envelopes with sufficie
postage prepaid thereon.

Robert C. Huntley, Jr.
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